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A 

PARTICULAR ACCOUNT 

OF THE 

BATTLE 









17TH OF JUNE, 1775. 



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BY A CITIZEN OF BOSTON. ♦ 






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BOSTON : 
PUBLISHED BY CUMMINGS, HILLIARD, Sf COMPANY. 

PRINTED BY HILLIARD AND METCALF. 

1825. 



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ADVERTISEMENT. 



As there have been several accounts, heretofore given, of 
the Battle of Bunker Hill, it may be thought unnecessary 
again to bring the subject before the public, and impossible 
to say any thing of importance, not to be found in former 
narratives. It may be observed, that some of those accounts 
have been found to be partial and incomplete ; and that some 
were written, not so much for the purpose of giving a correct 
view of all the events, as to establish particular facts, before 
denied or doubted. It has been suggested that a more par- 
ticular yet brief statement of that enterprise would be ac- 
ceptable to the public at this time. Inquiries are often made 
on the subject, and are likely to be repeated, as a formal 
celebration of that ever-memorable event is soon to take 
place. 

The most correct and perfect account, which has been 
given, was by Colonel S. Swett, by way of Appendix to a 
second edition of the Life of General Israel Putnam, pub- 
lished about seven years ago. The design of the writer of 
the following narrative is to give a concise statement, and yet 
to record whatever is material and important. Having exam- 
ined and compared all former accounts with diligence, and 
received some additional statements, he believes that it will 
not be considered a mere republication of other and earlier 
accounts. He has confined himself to the transactions of the 
day and the event, with reference only to some circumstances 
closely connected therewith ; nor has he indulged in any re- 
marks which belong more properly to the historian or to the 
orator. 

Boston, May 20th, 1825. 



BATTL 



BUNKER OR BREED'S HILL. 



The battle in Charlestown, Massachusetts, which 
was fought between the British and Americans, on the 
17th of June, 1775, was an event of great interest 
and importance. It was the first real trial of strength 
and courage between the troops of the parent country 
and of the provinces. The affair at Lexington and 
Concord, on the 19th of April preceding, could hardly 
be called a battle. Though a few guns were fired by 
the militia assembled under arms at Lexington, after 
they were attacked, yet no attempt was made by them 
to oppose the march of the British, who were ten 
times more numerous.* And at Concord Bridge, 

s 

* General Heath says, " The British advanced towards the militia, 
ordered them to disperse, huzzaed, and fired upon them. Several were 
killed and wounded, and the rest dispersed." Gordon says, " The huz- 
zaing- and firing- produced an immediate dispersion ; though some of the 
militia fired before, or as they were dispersing." The British account 
was, " that the militia, when ordered to disperse, immediately retired in 
confusion ; but that several guns were fired upon the king's troops from 
behind the stone wall ; by which one man was wounded, and Major 
Pitcairn's horse was shot." Mrs. Warren says, " The British made an 
attack upon the defenceless peasants at Lexington — that Colonel Smith 
ordered them to lay down their arms and disperse ; at the same time 
ordered his troops to fire, and proceeded without molestation to 
Concord." 



where a part of the British troops was opposed with 
much spirit and bravery, there was nothing really de- 
serving the name of a formal battle. The British were 
pursued, indeed, on their return to Boston, but in a 
very irregular manner, as the militia collected on the 
occasion were not sufficiently numerous to justify them 
in offering a serious contest. But that at Breed's Hill 
was a hard fought battle. Large detachments of 
American and British troops were closely engaged in 
martial combat for several hours* The contest was 
most severe and bloody. A fair trial was exhibited of 
the military powers of each. 

It would seem that a battle must have been expect- 
ed by the Americans ; yet so little was done by way of 
previous preparation, and so unequal were they in dis- 
cipline, in arms, and in numbers, to meet the British, 
that it may be considered by some as a rash and im- 
prudent measure to challenge an engagement as they 
did. The event, indeed, proved their courage and 
heroism, notwithstanding their final defeat. They 
contended against the enemy with a desperate resolu- 
tion, as if the liberties of their country depended upon 
the issue of that single battle. And, perhaps, it is not 
too much to say, that it did so in a great degree. 

The British received a formidable check. They 
had melancholy evidence of the resolution and bravery 
of the provincial troops. From that battle, they learn- 
ed to appreciate aright the character of Americans. 
They were convinced of the great suffering and blood- 
shed which would attend the contest in which they 



* The first attack was made between two and three o'clock ; and 
the Americans did not retreat till after six o'clock. It is said, in a 
letter from a British ofiicer, that the battle continued nearly four hours. 



were engaged. And, from that day, they feared to 
attempt (what, if they had attempted, might have 
proved most disastrous to the American cause) an at- 
tack upon our undisciplined troops, and which, as a 
regular army, furnished with all necessary military 
stores and arms, they ought to have done. 

We have suggested, that the battle of Breed's Hill 
was a rash affair on the part of the Americans It 
was so considered, at the time, by many judicious 
men in the Provincial Congress and Committee of 
Safety, though the majority of the latter did finally 
sanction the enterprise. Even Warren, ardent and 
resolute as he was, considered it a desperate undertak- 
ing. No reasonable man could have supposed that 
the Americans would maintain their position so near 
Boston, where the British had 10,000 regular troops, 
and when they had command of the waters of Charles 
river by their ships of war. Had the latter been as 
successful as they had reason to calculate, they would, 
with the troops* they landed at Charlestown, have 
driven the Americansf from their works (which afford - 

* There are different accounts of the number of Brilish troops en- 
gaged in this battle. Some have stated them to be three, and others, 
five thousand. General Gage, in his official account, said there were 
about 2000. By comparing several early statements, it appears that 
somewhat more than 3000 first landed at Charlestown, and made two 
attacks upon the Americans; and that about 1000 passed over, after- 
wards, as a reinforcement; and, joining those of the first detachment 
who survived, made the third attack, when the redoubt was carried. 

| The whole number of provincials engaged did not, probably, much 
exceed 2000. Some, indeed, have supposed there were only about 1500. 
Those, who went on to Breed's Hill the evening of the 16th, have 
usually been estimated at 1000 : being PrescoWs, parts of Bridgets and 
Fryt's regiments, a detachment of 120, with four lieutenants, from 
General Putnam's regiment, under command of Captain Knowlton- 



ed but a partial shelter, almost destitute as they were 
of cannon as well as of powder) ; and pursued them to 
Cambridge, where General Ward was stationed with 
the main body of the provincial troops ; who would 
probably have been routed by such a poweiful force. 
The plan of taking possession of the heights of 
Charlestown was adopted, in consequence of intelli- 
gence that the British general intended to occupy that 
position, and also the high land on Dorchester Neck, 
on the south of Boston, in order to extend his situa- 
tion, and to take advantage of possessing these com- 
manding places, to attack the provincials at Cambridge 
or Roxbury, whenever he might think it proper.* It 



and one artillery company. The regiments, at this time, consisted of 
ten companies of sixty men each ; but very few of them were full. The 
reinforcements, which were sent on the next day, though belonging to 
several regiments, did not probably exceed 12 or 1300, (and some of 
these arrived only in time to protect and cover the retreat.) These 
consisted of two regiments from New Hampshire, under Stark and 
Reed ; two more companies of Putnam's regiment, commanded by 
Chester and Clark ; parts of Little's, Whitcomb's, Brewer's, Nixon's, 
Gerrish's, and Gardner's regiments, the latter of which was not order- 
ed on to the field till a late hour, and after the first attack of the Brit- 
ish, though its brave commander was anxious to march at the first 
alarm. There is proof that only parts, even of these incomplete regi- 
ments, were in the battle. 

* Soon after the affair at Lexington and Concord, of the 19th of 
April, the " minute men" (so called) and others, to the number of about 
15,000, assembled in the vicinity of Boston. Many of them were with- 
out efficient and complete equipments. In powder they were very defi- 
cient. And as to artillery, it was little more than a name. Of these 
men, nearly 10,000 belonged to Massachusetts; Connecticut, New 
Hampshire, and Rhode Island furnished the residue. General Ward 
was appointed commander in chief by the Provincial Congress of Mas- 
sachusetts ; General Thomas was second in command, and was stationed 
at Roxbury. Washington had not taken the chief command. He was 
appointed, about the middle of June, by the Continental Congress, and 
arrived at Cambridge on the 3d of July ; when the troops were soon 



was not until the 15th of June that the Americans de- 
termined to occupy the former spot. Why more time 
was not allowed for preparation is not known. It is 
probable there was an apprehension that the British 
intended to take immediate possession.* 

The detachments ordered upon this most hazardous 
enterprise consisted of about 1000 men, under the par- 
ticular and immediate command of Colonel William 
Prescott of Pepperell in the county of Middlesex. Far 
the greater part of the detachment belonged to Massa- 
chusetts, and chiefly to that county, and included a part 
of Colonel Ebenezer Bridge's and a part of Frye's regi- 
ments, with about 120 from General f Israel Putnam's 

organized as a national army. It is probable, however, that, before he 
took the command, all the troops collected acknowledged General Ward 
as chief; and that there was an understanding to act in concert, and with 
some regularity and system, though the organization of the troops was 
not perfect. A contrary supposition would imply extreme inattention 
or want of military knowledge, both in the Committee of Safety and in 
the officers assembled; several of whom had been in the campaigns of 
1756, 1757, and 1758. 

* It is said by those who were then living, and in a situation to know 
all the circumstances connected with the enterprise, that it was under- 
taken at the particular instance of General Putnam, and that Colonel 
Prescott requested to have the post, in which he so bravely distinguished 
himself. Putnam expressed the opinion, that something must be done (un- 
prepared as they then were for offensive operations), to employ the men 
and to accustom them to military service. Hs conducted the expedi- 
tion to Noddle's and Hog Islands, in Boston harbour, the last of May, 
to prevent a large quantity of sheep from falling into the hands of the 
British, in which he discovered great activity and courage; and on the 
10th of June he marched from Cambridge to Charlestown, with most of 
the provincial troops, collected at the former place. This was done in 
full sight of the British in Boston, and with a view to excite a spirit of 
emulation and courage in the militia, who were then assembled in arms 
for the defence of the country. 

\ Though called General, he had then command only of a regiment, 
which was the case of several general officers in Massachusetts at that 
time. The other Connecticut troops were stationed at Roxbury. 



10 

regiment (from Connecticut), with Captain Knowlton 
as their chief officer.* Putnam accompanied this de- 
tachment, and, according to the testimony of several 
respectable witnesses who were in the expedition, had 
the superintendance of it ; or gave direction and ad- 
vice, which, even if he attended as a volunteer, must 
have had much influence. That he had the official 
and authorzed command^ may be difficult to prove by 

* Judge Grovesnor, now living, was a lieutenant in this corps, and 
was wounded the next day at the rail fence. The statement lately 
made by him is as follows: — "I was one of the detachment from Gen- 
eral Putnam's regiment, posted at Cambridge. On the evening of 16th 
June, Captain Knowlton, with four subalterns and 120 men, were de- 
tached and marched to Breed's Hill, with others of Massachusetts. 
General Putnam was with us and attended to laying out the ground for 
erecting the redoubt. He returned to Cambridge that night, and at- 
tended early the next morning. He was on the hill repeatedly during 
the day ; acd particularly at the posting of the troops in the redoubt, 
and at the arm of the ditch leading north towards Mxjstick River, and at 
the rail fence adjoining the river. Colonel Prescott was constantly 
with the troops ; but General Putnam was backwards and forwards 
from Cambridge during the day, to bring on reinforcements. He 
commanded and ordered the troops engaged with regularity and satis- 
faction, so far as I know." — " When the British landed at Moreton's 
Point, the detachment under Knowlton, from Putnam's regiment, was 
ordered by the General to take post at a rail fence on the left of the 
breastwork. This was promptly executed. Each man was furnished 
with a pound of powder and forty-eight balls. J\To corps was posted at 
the rail fence, save our own, at the time the fire began." 

| Different opinions have prevailed on this point. But on compar- 
ing all the circumstances and transactions of the occasion, by recellect- 
ing the conduct of Putnam, as stated bj' several persons in the battle, 
and by other citizens who were on Charlestown heights as volunteers, 
and by assuming that such an important enterprise would not have been 
undertaken by advice of the Council of War or Committee of Safety, 
without some system (although the short time there was to make ar- 
rangement, and the imperfect organization of the American troops pre- 
vented it being entirely regular and complete), it will appear that he 
was, in fact, the commander in chief. He evidently acted as such ; and 



11 

direct evidence. The orderly-book of General Ward 
is silent on the subject. Putnam was a very active as 
well as brave officer, and had seen much military ser- 
vice in a former war between France and England. 
Colonel Gridley was also with the detachment, and 
acted as engineer. 

This detachment of provincial troops proceeded to 
the peninsula of Charlestown late in the evening of 
the 16th of June. They paused on Bunker Hill ; but 
after some consultation they concluded to advance to 
Breed's Hill, which lies nearer to Boston by about 120 
rods, and is about the same distance from the banks of 
Charles River.* It was nearly midnight when they 

either had the appointment by General Ward, or by designation and 
consent of the Council of War. He superintended the works the night 
of the 16th ; was there again early on the morning of the 17th; direct- 
ed Kiowlton to the rail fence, when the enemy landed at Moreton's 
Point ; advised to carry the entrenching tools to Bunker's Hill, and 
there ordered another breastwork to be thrown up, though when the 
enemy advanced to the attack, he relinquished it, and marched his 
men to the lines ; was seen riding along the lines, directing and ani- 
mating the troops ; often rode to the Neck and beyond, to urge on the 
recruits ; and, in company with Prescott, covered the rear of the 
Americans on their retreat. Still, perhaps he had not that entire and 
complete command which would have been given, if the army had been 
perfectly organized, and the expedition regularly and maturely prepar- 
ed. That he was often on Bunker Hill, where he could take a full 
view of the whole ground and of all the troops engaged, both British 
and American, and rode to the Neck to hasten and urge on the rein- 
forcements, instead of remaining posted either at the redoubt or at 
the rail fence, go to prove rather that he was commander of the expe- 
dition, than that he was inactive or out of place. 

* In a direct line, Copps' Hill, at the northern part of Boston, 
where the British had a fortress, is about half a mile from Breed's Hill 
in Charlestown. No reason can be given why the Americans chose to 
fortify Breed's rather than Bunker Hill, but that it was nearer to Bos- 
tan. Bunker Hill is much more elevated, and would have been more 
difficult to attack by the enemy. 



12 

began to throw up a redoubt (as had been previously 
ordered by a Council of War at Cambridge), for a 
partial defence against the British, who they could not 
but believe would soon attack them. As a fortress, 
of which they were to retain permanent possession, 
they could not have proposed it ; for, without more 
cannon and a greater supply of ammunition, they must 
have known that they could not long hold out against 
the superior and formidable force of the British in 
Boston. Such was the opinion even of the sanguine 
and heroic Putnam, expressly given by him to General 
JVarren, when he came on the field, just before the 
enemy first advanced to the attack. 

In the course of the night, when the works were in 
forwardness and the men industriously engaged in com- 
pleting them, General Putnam returned to his quarters 
in Cambridge. But early in the morning, on hearing 
the cannonade of the British, which began soon after 
the dawn of day, from their fort at the northern part 
of Boston, and their ships of war in Charles River, 
he repaired again with great alacrity to Charlestown. 
During the night, Colonel Prescott, attended by Major 
Brooks,* proceeded to the margin of the river, to as- 
certain whether the British were alarmed and were 
preparing to attack them ; but all appeared quiet. At 
an early hour of the morning, Prescott sent to General 

* Brooks was major of Bridge's regiment. He commanded a battal- 
ion of minute men iu the affair at Concord on the 19th of April. Dur- 
ing the war of the revolution, he held a colonel's commission, and was 
repeatedly distinguished for acts of bravery, and in high estimation as 
a correct disciplinarian. Afterwards he was major general of militia, 
and governor of Massachusetts. He died the first of March last, uni- 
versally respected and beloved, sincerely and deeply lamented. 



13 

Ward,* at Cambridge, for provisions and reinforce- 
ments. His men were fatigued, and the works were 
not finished. No answer and no supplies were received. 
At nine o'clock, Major Brooks, as a confidential offi- 
cer, was despatched to head quarters, with an urgent 
request for more supplies and men. But on this mes- 
sage, requiring the greatest despatch, he was obliged 
to travel on foot. No horse was to be procured. It 
was nearly ten when he arrived at Cambridge. A 
consultation was immediately had between General 
Ward and others, as to the propriety of sending more 
troops from the main body at that place. It was be- 
lieved the British would avail of the circumstance of 
a great portion of the provincials being at Charles- 
town, to make an attack on Cambridge, by passing 
directly over the bay from the western part of Boston,f 
disperse the men retained there, and destroy the scanty 
stores collected ; which would prove a disaster that it 
would be almost impossible to repair. It was consid- 



* It is argued, that if General Putnam had the regular and official 
command of the expedition, he would have made the request to Ward 
for provisions and recruits ; and that Prescott would have applied to 
Putnam, and not to Ward, for any assistance he needed. That Putnam 
was on the field early, there is full proof; and it also appears that he 
was active at the redoubt, and in his endeavours to bring- on more men. 
It is not improbable that he joined with Prescott in the message to 
Ward for reinforcements. It is evident that there was a want of perfect 
organization and system in the militarj' movements of the day. But 
this does not disprove that Putnam was considered and acted as com- 
mander in chief. And we cannot but believe that, as there were com- 
manders of companies and of regiments, and as Prescott was stationed 
at the redoubt, there was a commander in chief of the whole, who su- 
perintended and directed the movements of all the troops concerned in 
the expedition. 

f At this time the British had not landed at Charlestown, and it was 
uncertain where they would make an attack. 



14 

ered necessary, therefore, to retain a large force at 
Cambridge, notwithstanding the perilous situation and 
urgent request of Putnam and Prescott. 

The remainder of Putnam's regiment, stationed in 
the easterly part of Cambridge, near Ionian's farm, so 
called, were very desirous of marching to Charlestown ; 
but General Ward believed their service would be 
more important in checking the British, should they 
come out from Boston and make an attack upon head 
quarters.* At a later hour, however, they were per- 
mitted to proceed to Charlestown, for the support of 
their fellow citizens there engaged. These were com- 
manded by Captains Chester, Coit, and Clark, and 
reached the rail fence, where Knowlton was stationed, 
just as the engagement began. 

At an early hour in the forenoon, Gardner's regi- 
ment was ordered to proceed down the Charlestown 
road, near the foot of Prospect Hill, and there to re- 
main till further orders should be given them.f In this 
situation they remained until after one o'clock ; when, 
seeing the enemy's boats pass over to Charlestown, 
the Colonel consulted with his officers and it was agreed 
to march immediately to the heights of Charlestown. 

In the meantime, it had been concluded by General 
Ward to send to Medford for some New Hampshire 
militia, under Colonels Stark and Reed, J who were 

* For a similar reason, no doubl, the provincial troops at Roxbury 
were not ordered to reinforce those at Charlestown. It would have 
left the American camp, in that place, wholly exposed to the British ; 
who might have easily marched from Boston and made an attack upon it. 

•j- Scammons' regiment was ordered to Lechmere's Point, and Little's 
still nearer to the Neck. 

\ This proves that Ward had command of all the men in the vicini- 
ty, even from other colonies; or that there was a disposition to act iu 
concert, under his direction, for the common defence. 



15 

ordered to Bunker Hill, for a support to the men al- 
ready there. It was between ten and eleven o'clock 
when the messenger was despatched from Cambridge 
with these orders. The brave New Hampshire men 
soon prepared to obey. But it was about one o'clock 
when they left Medford ; and must, therefore, have 
been two o'clock, or later, when they reached Bunker 
Hill. They were in season, however, to repair to the 
lines on the left of the redoubt, at the breastwork and 
rail fence (where the Connecticut troops, under Cap- 
tain Knowlton, were, by the special direction of Gen- 
eral Putnam, already stationed), when the attack was 
first made by the enemy. 

Putnam, who rode to Bunker Hill, and even to the 
Neck, or still farther, to hasten on the reinforcements, 
which were requested and expected as soon as the 
British landed at Moreton's Point, met the New Hamp- 
shire troops, and entreated their immediate presence at 
the lines ; with which they as readily complied. He 
also probably directed or advised the position most suit- 
able for them to take. Parts of Little's regiment, sent 
on from Cambridge, and of Gardner's, already mention- 
ed, arrived on Bunker Hill just before or about this 
time, and were directed chiefly to the rail fence, but 
some to the redoubt. At this time also it was, or a 
few moments earlier (for it was just before the British 
made the first attack), that Judge Winthrop saw Put- 
nam and Warren conversing together a little in the 
rear of the eastern part of the breastwork, on the left 
of the fort. A soldier in Knowlton's company also 
states, " that, just as the battle began, he saw General 
Putnam earnestly engaged in rallying some men, who 
were retreating towards Bunker Hill ; and that, after 



16 

he had drove back as many as he could, he rode to- 
wards the redoubt." 

In the course of the forenoon, notwithstanding the 
heavy fire of the British from their ships of war, and 
their fort in Boston, a redoubt was thrown up by the 
Americans of about eight rods square, and a breast- 
work, on the left of it, extending down the eastern 
declivity of the hill, about seventy feet. East of this 
breastwork, and a little northerly in the rear of it, was 
the rail fence, at which the few Connecticut men were 
first placed, and afterwards the New Hampshire troops 
and two more companies of the Connecticut forces, as 
well as some belonging to Massachusetts, who came 
on about the same time.* The rail fence stretched 
almost to Mystick River; and an effort was made by 
the Connecticut troops, under Knowlton, to render it 
something like a protection, by adding another fence 
in the vicinity, and throwing up some grass recently 
mown against it. 

Colonel Prescott commanded in and at the redoubt, 
which had just been finished under his inspection. He 
had sent two companies down into the street towards 
the ferry way to reconnoitre, but they were soon re- 
called and placed in and near the fort. Some of the 
men, with Prescott, were on the exterior of the re- 
doubt, but near it, on the right and left. He seems to 
have had the sole command of this important post, 
while Putnam was urging on the recruits and inspect- 
ing the troops in other parts of the peninsula. 

* It appears, from some accounts, that a part of the New Hampshire 
militia, and Uiose of Massachusetts, were placed at the breastwork, iu 
the low land between the redoubt and the rail fence. 



17 

Not only was the detachment, under Captain Knowl- 
ton, ordered to the rail fence on the left, but most of 
the fresh troops which came on to the field, as rein- 
forcements, were directed to take the same position. 
The redoubt was sufficiently furnished with men to 
act with effect, though deficient in cannon, ammuni- 
tion, and bayonets, to enable them to repel the British, 
who were superior both in numbers and equipments. 
A part of LittWs regiment seems to have been the 
only troops ordered to the redoubt, in addition to those 
stationed there at an earlier hour. 

On the left, at the breastwork and rail fence, a large 
force became indispensable. The movements of the 
British, soon after they formed for the attack, fully in- 
dicated their purpose to march a large detachment near 
the margin of Mystick River, at a considerable dis- 
tance northeast of the redoubt, and then to make an 
attack in the rear of it. A great portion of their 
troops were so disposed of as soon to render this plan 
most evident ; while another party of them prepared 
to advance directly in front of the redoubt. Prescott 
was in full preparation to receive them at the fort ; 
and all the attention and activity of Putnam were put 
in requisition to meet them on the left, and to prevent 
their advancing in that direction. Accordingly we find, 
from all the testimony given at the time and subse- 
quently, that General Putnam was making every pos- 
sible effort to forward fresh troops to that quarter. 
For this purpose, soon after the British landed, he rode 
to the Neck and beyond, and urged the scattered com- 
panies and parts of regiments, which he found, to pro- 
ceed with the greatest despatch to the rail fence and 
to the breastwork on the left of the fort. 
3 



18 

The British were some time in determining upon 
the particular mode of attack, and in forming after 
they had decided ;* it was between two and three 
o'ciock when they first advanced to the bloody con- 
test.! This was done in two separate bodies ; one 
directed towards the redoubt on Breed's Hill, and the 
other towards the rail fence on the left and near 
Mystick River. The British began the fire upon the 
provincials when at a considerable distance, and with- 
out much effect. But the latter reserved their fire, by 
the express orders of Putnam and Prescott, no doubt 
by previous agreement, until the enemy had approach- 
ed within about eight rods; when they poured forth a 
most destructive volley of small arms, and continued 
it for some minutes (as rank after rank of the British 
succeeded), by which a great number of the assailants 
were cut to pieces, while comparatively lew of the 
Americans received any injury. The British troops 
were soon thrown into confusion, and retreated to the 
margin of the river, where they first landed. 

The British officers soon rallied their men, and 
formed anew for a second attack ; during which Gen- 
eral Putnam rode to the Neck to press on such of the 
militia as might have advanced thus far, and some of 
whom were reluctant to march nearer to the place of 
slaughter. The incessant firing of a sloop of war and 

* They landed near Moreton's Point, S. E. from Breed's Hill. 

f Bulta says the Americans laboured at their entrenchments during 1 
the whole day ; and that the British did not make the attack till 
towards night. He is not entirely correct in this statement. He is 
also mistaken, in saying, that the British had floating batteries in Mys- 
tick River, and the Americans a competent artillery. 



19 

of several floating batteries in Charles River,* render- 
ed it extremely dangerous to pass on to the peninsula. 
Putnam rode over the Neck repeatedly, to show that 
himself was without fear, and that it was possible to 
pass unhurt. 

The British soon advanced a second time as before • 
a portion towards the redoubt, and others to the breast- 
work and rail fence on the east.f The Americans 
were prepared to receive them with equal resolution as 
at the first assault ; and orders were again given by 
Putnaw, Prescott, and other officers, to withold their 
fire until the enemy should approach even nearer than 
before. The enemy were again repulsed with great 
slaughter. They soon shrunk from the tremendous fire 
of the provincials;! and a second time retreated to the 
banks of the river. The British soldiers were discour- 
aged, and were not led on again to the attack, but by 
repeated orders and threats, and until a reinforcement 
arrived from Boston. The Americans, on the contra- 
ry, were elated by their repeated success : though the 
officers must have perceived the difficulty of long main- 
taining their position, unless the}' could receive a new 
supply of ammunition and large reinforcements of 
men. 

The third attack was not made by the British with- 
out considerable delay. They sent to Boston for more 
troops ; which were forwarded, indeed, with all possi- 
ble despatch, accompanied by several officers of high 

* It has been supposed by some that there were floating batteries ia 
Mystick River also ; but this was a mistake. 

f It was at this period that the town of Charlestown was set on fire 
by the British, and the whole burnt, consisting- of about 500 buildings. 

t The British officers said the Americans fought like "devils." 



20 

rank and great military skill and experience. During 
this interval, it appears that General Putnam again 
rode to the Neck, and to a short distance beyond, 
where some provincials had assembled from the neigh- 
boring towns. Some of these were unwilling to pro- 
ceed, as it was very dangerous passing the Neck, and 
as they expected the troops on the Heights must soon 
retreat. At this time, also, unfortunately, a part of 
the artillery, from a defect in the apparatus of their 
guns, or some great error in judgment, retired from 
the field of action ; which served to discourage the 
militia from advancing. 

These men belonged to Massachusetts, were im- 
perfectly organized, and unaccustomed to military dis- 
cipline. The resolute and brave, however, readily 
hastened to the relief of those who had already been 
long engaged. Having urged the advance of these 
troops, Putnam returned to those he had left at the 
lines, with the great despatch for which he was always 
distinguished ; and arrived some time before the rein- 
forcements came up, to encourage the men and to di- 
rect their movements on the renewed attack of the 
British, which was then expected. 

In the third and last attack the enemy conducted 
with much deliberation. They were convinced of the 
great importance of their field artillery ; and particu- 
lar care was taken to have it accompany the troops. 
It was taken to the eastern declivity of Breed's Hill, 
between the rail fence and the breastwork, where it 
was directed along the line of the Americans at the 
latter position, and a part pointed also into the opening 
or gate-way of the redoubt, which was on the north- 



21 

eastern comer. The redoubt was now attacked also 
on the southeastern and southwestern sides by the 
enemy with fixed bayonets. At the same time, a col- 
umn of the British advanced against the provincials 
posted at the rail fence on the extreme left. 

Those in the redoubt were destitute of bayonets, 
and their powder also was soon expended. In this 
situation, after having made a most resolute resistance 
for some time, but without a possibility of maintain- 
ing their ground, and in hope of saving the lives of his 
brave men, the intrepid Prescott ordered a retreat. 
To effect this, surrounded as he was by the British, was 
a difficult task. The troops on the left were ordered to 
cover them as they retired.* And this important ser- 
vice was performed with ability and despatch. Putnam 
and Prescott, having braved the enemy as long as hope 
remained, were very active in conducting the retreat. f 
Though many of the Americans were killed or wound- 
ed by the British troops, who pursued them to Bunker 
Hill, a great degree of regularity and order was main- 
tained by the attention and activity of the officers, J as- 

* The troops at the rail fence were closely engaged with a column 
of the British, when those at the redoubt were obliged to retreat. They 
fought with great bravery, and had hitherto prevented he advance of 
the enemy, whose plan was to force their way and turn this flank of the 
provincials. Here the New Hampshire men under Colonels Stark and 
Reed, and the Connecticut men under Captains Knowlton, Chester, 
Clark, and Lieutenant Grosvenor, gave proofs of a firmness and cour- 
age, which richly entitled them to the glory of a victory. 

| According to the statement of several persons who were in this 
battle, Putnam and Prescott kept in the rear of the provincials as they 
retreated, and were much exposed to the fire of the British troops, who 
pursued them to Bunker Hill. 

\ It is stated, in a report of a committee of the Provincial Congress, 



22 

sisted by some fresh troops, who arrived at this time. 
This was between six and seven o'clock. Here Gen- 
eral Putnam proposed to make a stand and fortify ; 
but the plan was too desperate to meet the approbation 
of any other officers. " He wished, at least, to face 
the enemy and given them one more fire before they 
left the peninsula." But the men were too much ex- 
hausted and too destitute of ammunition to comply 
with his proposal. The provincials, therefore, passed 
over the Neck ; and some posted themselves at Winter 
and Prospect Hills, within a mile and a half of Bun- 
ker Hill, and others proceeded to Ward's head quar- 
ters, at Cambridge, a distance of about three miles. 

Just at the moment the word was given to retreat, 
General Warren, who was near the redoubt, received 
a musket ball in the head, and immediately expired. 
He was President of the Provincial Congress and of 
the Committee of Safety at this time ; and three days 
before had been appointed a Major General of the Mas- 
sachusetts troops. On this occasion, he was merely a 
volunteer. His ardent and patriotic feelings led him 
to the scene of danger, as soon as he heard of the 
threatened attack. He was among the most eminent 
of the many brave men, who, at that critical period, 
were ready to sacrifice every thing for the liberties of 
the country. 



" that the retreat was conducted with more regularity, than could be 
expected of troops, who had been no longer under discipline, and many 
of whom never before saw an engagement ; and that the retreat of the 
men from the redoubt would have been effectually cut off, had it not 
happened that the flanking party of the enemy was checked by a party 
of our men, at the rail fence, who fought with the utmost bravery." 
These belonged chiefly to Connecticut and New Hampshire. 



23 

The slaughter, on this occasion, was very great. 
The British had nearly 150U killed and wounded ; and 
the Americans estimated theirs at about 350. Some 
statements have given different numbers. But the 
above may be considered as very near the truth. 
Governor Gage's account, prepared soon after the bat- 
tle, gave only 3000 in the engagement ; and 1100 kill- 
ed and wounded. It was his policy to make a favour- 
able report. From the most accurate calculation, it is 
evident that the whole number of the British engaged 
could not have been less than 4500 (some suppose 
about 5000) ; and soon after the battle it was reported 
and generally believed, that the whole number of the 
enemy killed and wounded amounted to 1492 ; ninety 
of which were commissioned officers. Of the provin- 
cials, 250 were wounded and 136 killed and missing; 
thirty of the latter were afterwards known to have re- 
turned to their repective homes the night following the 
battle. 

Of the officers killed or mortally wounded in the 
provincial regiments, the principal were General Jo- 
seph Warren, Colonel Thomas Gardner, who sur- 
vived a few days : Lieutenant Colonel Parker, who 
was mortally wounded, and died the week after in 
prison in Boston ; Majors M'Clary and Moore. The 
numbers of men killed or wounded in the several regi- 
ments engaged, were as follows. In Prescott's, 42 
killed and 28 wounded : in Bridge's, 16 killed and 30 
wounded ; in Frye's, 15 killed and 31 wounded ;* in 
the detachment from Putnam's regiment, consisting of 
about 250, 15 were killed and 30 wounded. Of the 

* Only parts of Bridge's and Frye's regiments were in the battle. 



24 

two New Hampshire regiments, under Stark and Reed 
(the latter of which was not full), 15 were killed and 
45 wounded ; in Little's, 7 killed and 23 wounded ; 
in Brewer's, 7 killed and 11 wounded; in Gardner's, 
6 killed and 7 wounded ; in Whitcomb's, 5 killed and 
8 wounded : and a few belonging to Nixon's and 
Gerrish's regiments. 

In referring to the officers, who particularly distin- 
guished themselves on this ever-memorable occasion, by 
their activity, their zeal, and courage, we may justly 
name General Israel Putnam of Connecticut ; Colo- 
nels William Prescott, Ebenezer Bridge, James 
Frye, and Moses Little ; Colonels John Stark 
and James Read, both of New Hampshire ; General 
Pomeroy, Lieutenant Colonels John Robinson and 
Willtam Buckminster, Major Henry Wood, (Gen- 
eral Warren, Colonel Gardner, Lieutenant Colonel 
Parker, and Majors M'Clary and Moore, who were 
slain or mortally wounded in the action), Captains 
Kkowlton, Chester, Coit, and Clark, Lieutenants 
Grosvenor, Keyes, Dana, and Hills, all of Con- 
necticut; Captain Henry Dearborn of New Hamp- 
shire ; and Captains Burnham, Trevett, Ford, 
Walker, Bancroft, and Ensign Thomas Miller,* 
&c. Many others exhibited great proofs of patriotism 
and courage, whose names it is not in our power par- 
ticularly to mention. 

The survivors of that brave and heroic band of free- 
men, who made such a resolute stand against the Brit- 
ish troops, on this occasion, which are recollected, are 

* Those not of Connecticut or New Hampshire belonged to Massa- 
chusetts. 



25 

General Henry Dearborn, Major John Burnham, 
Captain R. Trevett, Judge Grosvenor, General 
John Keyes,* General Benjamin Pierce, Deacon 
Thomas Miller, Major Daniel Jackson, Captain 
Benjamin Dana, John Brazer, Esq. and Mr Timo- 
thy Thompson. 

The Americans justly considered this defeat a great 
disaster, but they did not despond. It taught them the 
courage of their men, and the necessity of greater dis- 
cipline and preparation. The want of system and of 
military subordination was fully perceived. To this, 
in part, was attributed the final failure of that glorious 
enterprise. It would be unjust, perhaps, to accuse 
any one, then in high civil or military authority, of in- 
activity or want of spirit and zeal.f The contest was 
a glorious one to the Americans ; for, unprepared and 
unfurnished as they were with military stores and im- 
plements, a different result could not have been justly 
expected. That greater reinforcements were not pro- 
vided, was perhaps the fault of no individual. But 
had they been furnished, the British would probably 
have been checked and repulsed, in their third attack, as 
they were in the two former. The enemy could boast 
only of having gained possession of the field for which 
they contended. But it was not without double the 

* General Keyes was living- in the state of New York a short time 
since. 

\ Two colonels and a major of artillery were censured for remiss- 
ness of duty. The artillery was in a very imperfect state, which fur- 
nished some apology for the inefficiency of the officers, though one of 
them was justly blamed. The two colonels were evidently deficient in 
that zeal and activity, by which all the others engaged were distin- 
guished. 



26 

number of men to those whom they engaged. And 
they were convinced, by melencholy facts, that the 
provincials were too brave to be despised, or to be at- 
tacked except by superior numbers, and with every 
advantage of a competent artillery and a full supply of 
military stores. Though the American troops remain- 
ed for several months almost wholly without cannon, 
and deficient, to an alarming degree, of the essential 
article of powder, the British made no attack upon 
their lines, nor attempted any offensive operations. 




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